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Abstract 
This paper examines the direction of causality between Venture Capital (VC) and 
innovation (proxied by patents) in Europe. We test whether causality runs from patents to 
VC by estimating a linear dynamic panel model and causality from VC to patents by 
estimating a panel count model. Evidence from a European sample indicates that 
causality runs from patents to VC suggesting that, in Europe, innovation seems to create a 
demand for VC and not VC a supply of innovation. In this sense, innovative ideas seem 
to lack more than funds in Europe. 
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Introduction 
Venture Capital (henceforth VC) is financial investment channeled to the development of 
young, dynamic and innovative firms, and along with R&D, plays a major role in 
technological progress and innovation, most frequently proxied by the number of patent 
applications or grants at the appropriate level, firm, industry or country level. According 
to Gompers and Lerner (2001), some of the most renowned high-tech innovators in the 
US, such as Apple Computers, Cisco Systems, Genentech, Microsoft, Netscape, and Sun 
Microsystems, have developed thanks to VC assistance.  
 Research on the topic has also been abundant, most researchers stressing the role 
of VC in fostering innovation. Timmons and Bygrave (1986), Hellman and Puri (2000), 
Kortum and Lerner (2000) and Lerner (2002) have analyzed the US evidence, while 
Bottazi and Da Rin (2002) have found that, although the European VC market lags 
behind its US counterpart, European VC contributed substantially to the development of 
innovative companies listed in the Euro.nm stock market. The underlying idea in the 
literature above is the seemingly unquestionable assumption that VC generates 
innovation or, alternatively, that innovation is an output rather than an input of the VC 
process.  
 The widely accepted view of VC to innovation causality, let us call it the direct 
causation hypothesis, has been recently challenged by Ueda and Hirukawa (2003). On the 
basis of a US sample and assuming that Total Factor Productivity is a good proxy for 
technological progress and innovation, the authors have found that, at least at country 
level, causality runs from innovation to VC. However, when they examined the direct 
causation hypothesis at industry level, they found conflicting results. Reverse causation, 
according to the authors might well be the case when a substantial wave of innovation 
creates business opportunities and demand for VC finance. 
 In this paper we explore these contrasting views on the role of VC on 
technological progress and innovation and investigate the direction of causality in the 
innovation to VC relation. In other words we search for evidence in support of the 
direct/reverse causation based on a panel dataset of VC investments and European patent 
applications for 15 European countries for the period 1995-2004. To that we introduce 
causality in Granger’s (1969) sense, that is, we test whether the inclusion of lagged 
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values of the regressand in the right-hand side of the regression equation, including lags 
of the regressors improves predictability. The empirical method is based on standard 
panel data analysis. 
In order to allow for heterogeneity (fixed effect) of the cross section units, when 
testing for direct causation, we use a linear dynamic distributed lag model in first 
differences. The model is estimated using a dynamic panel data methodology (Holtz-
Eakin et al.; 1988 and Arellano and Bond; 1991). When we test for reverse causation, we 
apply a different method. Because the dependent variable, i.e. patents, consists in panel 
count data, the appropriate model is the Linear Feedback Model (Cincera, 1997; Blundell 
et al. 2002; Uchida and Cook, 2007) which includes lagged dependent counts among the 
regressors capturing eventually any heterogeneity of the cross section units.  
Our evidence seems to run against the direct causation and in support of the 
reverse causation hypothesis, i.e. the VC to innovation causality. In our opinion, this 
possibly implies that innovative projects tied with a probable patent grant have an edge 
over their non-patent counterparts in signaling higher “quality” and attracting VC 
finance. 
 The paper is structured as follows. First, we discuss the issues involved in the role 
of VC in technological progress and innovation; next we present our dataset and in a 
subsequent section we lay down explicitly our methodology and present the results. 
Finally, we epitomize our research in a concluding section. 
2. The Role of VC in Technological Progress 
Schumpeter’s initial claim was that dynamic entrepreneurs are the source of innovation, 
but in his later works he attributed innovation to large corporations (Nooteboom, 1983). 
Large firms have the edge over their smaller counterparts due to capital market 
imperfections and information asymmetries and their ability to fund independent R&D 
projects using their own resources. More recent studies examining the issue of the firm’s 
size on the production of innovation appear to be inconclusive (Tether, 1998). However, 
the emergence of VC markets in modern economies has provided some support in 
Schumpeter’s initial claim. Due to the lack of collateral, small innovative firms, mostly 
individual entrepreneurs, have limited access to capital markets in order to finance their 
 3
projects and hence, external equity is the main alternative. Venture Capitalists 
(henceforth VCsts), the managers of VC funds, come to bridge this funding gap by 
providing equity to small, dynamic and innovative firms, becoming thus, co-owners of 
the investee’s project.  
Although the role of VC in technological progress is in general acknowledged, it 
has received less attention in empirical research, as opposed to R&D investments whose 
contribution has been examined extensively in numerous papers. Pakes and Griliches 
(1980) were among the first to suggest a significant relation between R&D and patents. A 
series of related papers have found similar results. Namely, Hall et al. (1986), Cincera et 
al., (1997), Crepon and Duquet (1997) and Blundell et al (2002) and others report a quite 
strong effect of R&D to patents at the firm level.  
 Kortum and Lerner (2000) are among the few to investigate the VC to patent 
relation. Using US industry level data, they have showed that VC and R&D have a 
significant effect on patents and estimated to that a VC dollar is three times more 
valuable in generating patents compared to a normal dollar. Narrowing the focus to VC, 
Hellman and Puri (2000) have presented evidence at the firm level indicating that 
companies “pursuing an innovator rather than an imitator strategy are more likely to 
obtain Venture Capital financing”. Finally, Ueda and Hirukawa (2003) have presented 
country level evidence in support of the reverse hypothesis (“innovation comes first” in 
their terminology), using Total Factor Productivity as a proxy for innovation. In their 
view, “an arrival of new technology [resulting in increased numbers of patents] increases 
demands for VC capital by driving new firm start-ups”.  
In our opinion, reverse causation may also be explained in terms of information 
asymmetry considerations (Sahlman, 1990). VC might be deterred in the presence of 
severe adverse selection issues, due to the risk of venturing into an ex post unacceptably 
risky project. In this context, a patent can act as a signal, indicate the project’s higher 
quality and, as a consequence, attract prospective VC investment.  
On the other hand, VC, especially when funding the early stages of development 
1, can be considered as irreversible investment and according to the irreversibility-delay 
hypothesis (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) the decision to invest may be deterred in the 
presence of uncertainty over future cash flows. VC, especially early stage VC, is clearly a 
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sunk cost since it refers mostly to firms with no production and no secondary market for 
their assets. Irreversibility might also make the cost of adverse selection more severe and 
thus the signaling effect of a patent more valuable.  
Hence, we propose to test the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis: Because of information asymmetries and irreversibility considerations, 
innovation generates, rather than is generated by, VC activity. 
3. Data description 
Although the preceding analysis refers mostly to the firm level, the issues directly extend 
to any level of aggregation. In this paper we employ country level data, since we have no 
reason to believe that the aggregate behavior of firms should generate conflicting data on 
the VC to patent relation. We use annual VC data for 15 European countries obtained 
from the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA). The countries are Austria, 
Belgium Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK.  
Patent data refer to the European Patents Office (EPO) and have been obtained 
from the Eurostat Database. We as well choose patent applications rather than patent 
grants, as is typically the case in existing research, since there might be a significant time 
lag between filing an application and receiving a grant (Hall et al, 2001). Thus, we 
believe that the number of patent applications is a better proxy for a country’s innovation 
activity at a given year. On the other hand the signaling effect of a patent is more 
pronounced on the time of application rather than on the time of the patent grant. The 
same holds, in our opinion, for the irreversibility-delay effect: a patent application is 
more uncertain than a patent grant or a patent rejection. 
Statistical parameters of our sample are depicted in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 
presents European VC, Business R&D and patenting activity in 2004 and Table 2 
presents the descriptive statistics of our sample. The interested observer will note the 
great diversity across European countries both in terms of VC investment, R&D expenses 
but especially in the patent applications data with Germany showing the maximum patent 
count, almost seven times the average European count. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 AND 2 AROUND HERE] 
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Our EPO statistics on patent applications are classified by “priority date” that is, 
by the year of first filling in any national or regional patent organization (OECD patent 
glossary) prior to EPO. Ahead of applying to EPO, one might have applied to another 
national or regional office reserving thus, priority to a subsequent application to a second 
patents office (EPO for example) for the same patent within a given period of time. The 
European Patent Convention (EPC) restricts this period to one year (Article 87(1)). 
4. Methodology and Results 
In order to test the Patents to VC causality, the initial equation to be estimated is: 
    it
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                      (1) 
       with itiit ue +=η  
where all variables are expressed in logarithms, i and t denotes the cross section and time 
dimension respectively, 
it
u is the usual disturbance and iη is the individual or fixed effect. 
We make the standard hypothesis that iη  represents constant over time characteristics of 
the cross section units which might be correlated with the regressors.  
 Different countries might have time-invariant but different innovation networks or 
different mentality and attitude towards innovation, which might affect both VC 
investments and patenting. All lagged values ktiVC −,  are correlated with ia and thus, 
with ite  which induces a bias in OLS. Taking the first differences eliminates this 
individual effect and the respective bias:  
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 Since the right hand 1, −tiVC still depends on 1, −tiu , and OLS is still not the proper 
method, we apply Arellano and Bond’s (1991) Generalized Method of Moments. We 
assume that past values of VC and P  are not correlated with the current error term and 
we use lagged values of Patents and VC as instruments such that the following 
orthogonality conditions are satisfied: 
                      [ ] [ ] 0uuPEuuVCE 1titiis1titiis =−=− −− )()( ,,,, ,  for all )2( −≤ ts     (3) 
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 The above orthogonality conditions, relying on the absence of second order serial 
correlation among the first-differenced residuals (Arellano and Bond, 1991), are also 
proposed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988). For convenience we take ml =  and we use the 
Wald test to test the null hypothesis that all lagged coefficients of patents are not 
significant: 
0...:
210
====
m
cccH     (4) 
Rejection of the null hypothesis would imply that patents cause VC. Due to our 
small sample size and the limited time series dimension we apply this test only for m=1, 
2 and 3. We also test for second order serial correlation among the first-differenced 
residuals (Arellano and Bond, 1991), since the correct specification of the model requires 
no residual time dependency; any second order residual serial correlation would 
invalidate the use of lagged 2, −tiVC  values as an instrument. 
In order to test the reverse causality, i.e. from innovation to VC, an appropriate 
modeling is being called for. Since our data on patents are counts (positive integers) we 
have to apply models designed to facilitate the non-negativity and discreteness of patents. 
Furthermore, the panel form our data introduces individual heterogeneity of the cross 
section units which has to be taken explicitly into account.  
Assuming that our count variable follows a Poisson process and adding lags of the 
count among the regressors, we end up with a variant of the Linear Feedback Model 
(LFM) as the one introduced by Blundell et al, (2002) which in our purpose takes the 
following form: 
itiit
l
k
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1
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∑=ν  and )exp( iih η=  
and 
i
η is the individually specific characteristic (fixed effect).  
 Except for the drawbacks mentioned earlier, individual heterogeneity may also 
generate data overdispersion, that is, a conditional data variance significantly greater (and 
not equal to) than the conditional data mean (as in the usual Poisson specification) 
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(Cincera, 1997). Since iη  enters the model multiplicatively, usual differencing doesn’t 
eliminate it. We use instead the quasi-differenced Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimator proposed by Blundell et al. (2002) with the following orthogonality conditions:  
                           0)( =itil qPE  for all   2−≤ tl                                             (6)  
        and 0)( =itisqVCE  for all   1−≤ ts                                        (7) 
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 In order thus to examine the significance of the VC to patents causality, we 
assume that ml =  and test the null hypothesis that all coefficients of lagged VC 
investments are jointly zero: 
 0210 ==== md...dd:H                  (8) 
 We test the reverse causation hypothesis with the Wald test for m=1, 2 and 3 and 
we check for second order serial correlation (Uchida and Cook, 2007). 
 
 Our estimates are presented in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 presents the results of 
patents to VC causality test. The Wald tests for two and three lags indicate that the effect 
of lagged patents is jointly significant. At one lag, on the contrary, the coefficient of 
patents is not significant at acceptable probability levels.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE] 
 As to the VC to patents causality results depicted in Table 4, the Wald tests show 
that there is no joint significance of the VC coefficients for two and three lags. At one 
lag, the coefficient of VC is found to be significant but with a negative sign, which is in 
line with Ueda and Hirukawa’s (2003) finding. However, their claim that this is a stock 
market overreaction correction caused by rapid VC investment seems not to fit our 
sample.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE] 
 As depicted in Table 4, the Wald tests indicate that VC does not cause patents in 
our sample, whereas the joint significance of the patent coefficients in Table 3 verifies the 
hypothesis that patents cause VC, that is, innovation precedes VC investments. Reverse 
causation is generated, in our opinion, by information asymmetries and irreversibility 
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considerations. A small firm or an entrepreneur has to somehow indicate the quality of 
his project in order to be a good candidate for VC finance. Applying for a patent costs 
both money and time, thus a patent application signals high project quality and confers to 
the applicants cum investees an advantage over their non-applicant competitors. 
Moreover, given that VC investment is mostly irreversible, patent applicants cum 
investees will increase their edge even more. Hence, it seems that international 
differences in VC activity across countries are rather demand than supply side induced: 
ideas rather than funds are at shortage. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we have proposed a causality testing methodology in order to investigate 
whether patenting is an input or an output to the VC process, i.e. whether causation is 
direct, from innovation to VC, or reverse, from VC to innovation. The widely accepted 
patents to VC direct causation was tested by means of a GMM estimation of a linear 
dynamic panel in first differences, while reverse causation by means of a Linear 
Feedback Model due to the count nature of patents. Our findings indicate that causality in 
Europe runs from patents to VC and not the other way around. Adverse selection 
problems and irreversibility considerations may well explain the reason why innovation 
precedes rather that follows VC activity. 
 We also believe that, in the same line of argument, the low VC activity in some 
countries might also be attributable to the absence of value creating innovative ideas 
rather than the lack of available funds. 
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Table 1 
VC, business R&D and patenting activity in 2004 
 
Total VC* in 2004 
(percentage over total 
investments) 
Business R&D investment 
in 2004 (percentage over 
total investments) 
Patent applications at 
the EPO** (by 
priority year) in 2004 
Austria 0.24% 7.05% 1348 
Belgium 0.31% 6.33% 1405 
Denmark 0.73% 8.53% 1082 
Finland 0.35% 12.87% 1154 
France 0.48% 6.84% 7984 
Germany 0.26% 10.24% 23261 
Greece 0.01% 0.75% 75 
Italy 0.17% 2.52% 4581 
Netherlands 0.42% 5.40% 3956 
Norway 0.48% 4.38% 287 
Portugal 0.47% 1.15% 61 
Spain 0.53% 2.05% 1209 
Sweden 1.34% n.a. 2172 
Switzerland 0.20% n.a. 3087 
UK 1.18% 6.19% 5869 
R&D data were obtained from the Eurostat database      
*VC includes seed, start-up and expansion investments 
 **European Patents Office 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics 
 Total VC* Patent applications 
Mean  565439.8  3201.387 
Median  223850  1332.5 
Maximum  6099578  23261 
Minimum  844  14 
Std. Dev.  856426.4  4875.836 
Skewness  3.179  2.788 
Kurtosis  16.129  10.45 
Sum  84815964  480208 
Observations  150  150 
               *In thousand Euros 
 
 
            Table 3 
Patents cause VC 
 VC coefficients  Patent coefficients 
Wald test of 
Patent 
Coefficients 
( 2χ ) 
1
b  
2
b  
3
b  
 
1
c  
2
c  
3
c  
- 0.091 (0.133) - - 
1.238 
(0.697) - - 
30.637* 
[0.000] 
0.301** 
(0.127) 
-0.295** 
(0.126) - 
0.673 
(1.353) 
2.092** 
(0.828) - 
26.224* 
[0.000] 
0.419** 
(0.174) 
-0.395** 
(0.192) 
-0.079 
(0.160) 
-0.106 
(2.131) 
5.910* 
(1.998) 
-2.561 
(2.267) 
       
Standard errors in parenthesis and p-values in square brackets. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity 
robust.   Coefficients 
m
b and 
m
c correspond to VC and patents respectively where subscripts denote the 
number of lags. The test for second order serial correlation and the Sargan test are satisfied. 
    *Significant at 0,01 
 **Significant at 0,05 
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              Table 4 
VC causes Patents 
Standard errors in parenthesis and p-values in square brackets. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity 
robust.   The coefficients 
m
g and 
m
d correspond to patents and VC respectively where subscripts 
denote the number of lags. The test for second order serial correlation and the Sargan test are satisfied. 
    *Significant at 0,01 
 **Significant at 0,05 
 
 Patent coefficients  VC coefficients 
Wald test of 
VC 
coefficients 
( 2χ ) 
1
g  
2
g  
3
g   1d  2d  3d  
- 0.766* (0.035) - -  
-0.094* 
(0.030) - - 
4.385 
[0.112] 
0.453* 
(0.113) 
0.349* 
(0.102) -  
0.017 
(0.015) 
-0.251** 
(0.123) - 
2.664 
[0.446] 
0.512 
(0.420) 
0.326** 
(0.152) 
-0.024 
(0.351)  
0.019 
(0.090) 
-0.344 
(0.302) 
0.058 
(0.197) 
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Endnotes 
 
                                                 
1 European Venture Capital Association’s (EVCA) terminology split VC into three stages namely, 
seed finace (intended for new firms in order to evaluate their initial concept), start-up finance(aiming at the 
development of the firm’s product before the firm has sold any products) and expansion finance (aiming to 
assist the growth and expansion of the firm)  
 
